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Abstract
The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The
bulk of contemporary epistemology has focused primarily on that task
of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criteriondoes the
belief in question correspond to reality? My contention is that the
aspect of ontology is far too separated from epistemology. This onto-
relationship between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method
of epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of jus-
tification. I will then discuss the role of inference from the onto-
relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best
suited for a foundationalist or coherentist model within a theistic con-
text.1
∗mlandrews@liberty.edu
1For inference to the best explanation (IBE) to be reliable, there must be a positive
correlation between explantoriness and truth. As discussed by Igor Douven in ”Testing
Inference to the Best Explanation,” Synthese 130 (2002), IBE really own works with
a realist conception. If IBE is to be accepted as a legitimate methodology it must be
substantiated in a self-affirming way, empirically evidenced, or privileged. Douven argued
that IBE is a testable methodology in a self-affirming way. If that does not work then it
would have to be a privileged belief (or basic belief) since it is certainly not empirically
justifiable.
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1 The Ontological Status of Reality and its
Relationship to Epistemology
Should it be the case that metaphysical naturalism be false (including differ-
ent modifications of simple or neo-Platonism) and theism be true it seems to
be the case that God created our cognitive faculties in such a way that there
is a certain fit or match between such faculties and the world. This is called
the adequation of the intellect to reality (adequation intellectus ad rem).
The main premise to this adequation is that there is an onto-relationship
between our cognitive or intellectual faculties and reality that enables us to
know something about the world, God, and ourselves.2 This immanent ra-
tionality inherent to reality is not God but it does cry aloud for God if only
because the immanent rationality in nature does not provide us with any
explanation of itself.3
In reality all entities are ontologically connected or interrelated in the
field in which they are found. If this is true then the relation is the most
significant thing to know regarding an object. Thus, to know entities as they
actually are what they are in their relation webs. Thomas Torrance termed
this as onto-relations, which points more to the entity or reality, as it is what
it is as a result of its constitutive relations.4
The methodology of the epistemological realist concerns propositions of
which are a posteriori, or thinking after, the objective disclosure of reality.
Thus, epistemology follows from ontology. False thinking or methodology
(particularly in scientific knowledge) has brought about a failure to recognize
the intelligibility actually present in nature and the kinship in the human
knowing capacity to the objective rationality to be known.5
Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457) developed the interrogative (interrogatio) rather
than the problematic (quaestio) form of inquiry. Valla’s mode of inquiry was
one in which questions yield results that are entirely new, giving rise to
knowledge that cannot be derived by an inferential process from what was
2Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 269.
3John Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas
Forsyth Torrance (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 106. Thomas Torrance, God
and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 93-94.
4Morrison, 106.
5Thomas Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 76-
80.
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already known. This method was similar to the works of Stoic lawyers and
educators like Cicero and Quintilian; that is, questioning witnesses, investi-
gating documents and states of affairs without any prior conception of what
the truth might be. Valla transitioned from not only using this method for
historical knowledge but also applied it as logic for scientific discovery.6
Valla’s logic for discovery was the art of finding out things rather than
merely the art of drawing distinctions and connecting them together. He
called for an active inquiry (activa inquisitio). John Calvin (1509-1564)
applied this method to the interpretation of Scripture and thus became the
father of modern biblical exegesis and interpretation.7 Francis Bacon (1561-
1626) applied it to the interpretation of the books of nature, as well as to
the books of God, and became the father of modern empirical science.8
This methodology created a split between subject and object, knowing
and being, and gave rise to phenomenalism. Newton claimed that he in-
vented no hypotheses but deduced them from observations produced ratio-
nalistic positivism, which engulfed contemporary European thought. This
splits gulf was widened by David Hume’s (1711-1776) criticism of causality
and inference, depriving knowledge of any valid foundation in necessary con-
nections obtaining between actual events and of leaving it with nothing more
reliable than habits of mind rooted in association.9 Hume weighed heavy in
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) philosophical development. Given the Newto-
nian understanding of space and time, Kant transferred absolute space and
time from the divine sensorium to the mind of man (the transfer of the iner-
tial system), thus intellect does not draw its laws out of nature but imposes
its laws upon nature. According to Kant one cannot know the Ding an Sich
(thing itself) by pure reason; one is therefore limited to the sensual and shap-
ing mental categories of the mind. That which comes through sensation the
intuitions are shaped by the mind’s a priori categories. It is in this sense
that Kant played an essential part in the development of the idea that man
is himself the creator of the scientific world.
Throughout Albert Einstein’s work, the mechanistic universe proved un-
satisfactory. This was made evident after the discovery of the electromagnetic
6Thomas Torrance, ”Einstein and Scientific Theology,”Religious Studies 8 no. 3 (1972):
236-237.
7Valla served in conjunction with Andrea Alciati (1492-1550) as Calvin’s primary in-
fluence for his biblical interpretation.
8Torrance, ”Einstein,” 237.
9Ibid., 240.
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field and the failure of Newtonian physics to account for it in mechanistic
concepts. Then came the discovery of four-dimensional geometry and with
it the realization that the geometrical structures of Newtonian physics could
not be detached from changes in space and time with which field theory
operated. Einstein stepped back into stride with Newton and his cognitive
instrument of free invention. It was free in the sense that conclusions were not
reached under logical control from fixed premises, and it was invented under
the pressure of the nature of the universe upon the intuitive apprehension
of it. Einstein used Newton and Maxwell’s partial differential equations in
field theory to develop a mode of rationality called mathematical invariance.
Mathematical invariance established a genuine ontology in which the subject
grips with objective structures and intrinsic intelligibility of the universe.10
This also meant a rejection of Kant’s synthetic a priori whereby knowl-
edge of the phenomenal world is said to be reduced to an order without
actual penetration into the Ding an Sich.11 Einstein’s categories are not
some form of Kantian a priori but conceptions that are freely invented and
are to be judged by their usefulness, their ability to advance the intelligi-
bility of the world, which is dependent of the observer. As he sees it, the
difference between his own thinking and Kant’s is on just this point: Einstein
understands the categories as free inventions rather than as unalterable (con-
ditioned by the nature of the understanding).12 It is by this method that one
can penetrate the inner rationality of the reality by discovery, imagination,
and insight in order to construct forms of thought and knowledge through
which the rationality of the object may be discerned.13 Einstein’s free in-
vention is quite synonymous with discovery in the sense that the consequent
conclusion (knowledge) is not inferred or entailed from a fixed categorical
antecedent (i.e. Kant).
Principles of method are closely related to empirical observations. As
Einstein put it, the scientist has to worm these general principles out of
nature by perceiving in comprehensive complexes of empirical facts certain
general features which permit of precise formulation.14 These principles, not
10Ibid., 241-42.
11Morrison, 90.
12Donna Teevan, ”Albert Einstein and Bernard Lonergan on Empirical Method,” Zygon
37 no. 4 (2002): 875-876.
13Morrison, 105
14Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, trans. and rev. Sonja Bargmann (New York:
Three Rivers, 1982), 221.
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isolated general laws abstracted from experience or separate results from
empirical research, provide the basis of deductive reasoning.15
2 What About A Priori and Non-Empirical
Knowledge?
The onto-relationships as described above concerning the intricate web and
connection between reality and its entailment of knowledge does not seem to
have such effect on a priori and non-empirical knowledge.16 Such method-
ology inevitably turns all such knowledge into scientific knowledgeso what
about ethical and religious knowledge17? Kant argued that such synthetic
a priori knowledge was logically prior to any a posteriori knowledge. Such
knowledge would be excluded from inferential knowledge but not necessar-
ily excluded form the onto-relationship with reality. This knowledge may
serve as an intuitive apprehension into the actual intrinsic relations in reality
(physical and metaphysical). This intuitive knowledge is rational but non-
logical and non-inferential. This could be said that it is the knowledge that
serves as the foundations, which arise in the minds assent under the impress
of objective structures in reality.18 There is no reason to limit such intuitive
apprehension of reality to the physical world only, which would serve as a
defeater for any further entailments for positivism or strict empiricism. Such
structures of reality may be purely metaphysical such as minds, abstract ob-
jects, or God. However, there must be some type of causal capacity for the
onto-relations to have effect, which would exclude abstract objects since they
do not seem to stand in causal relations. Thus, minds and God may serve as
plausible ontological origins for non-empirical knowledge.
15Teevan, 877.
6To claim that such inferential reasons are not good reasons for belief one might deny
the legitimacy of such forms of abductive reasoning as described above. The most common
objection to such reasoning is when the conclusion of the argument involves unobservables
(physically or metaphysically). Stephen Leeds, ”Correspondence Truth and Scientific Re-
alism,” Synthese 159 (2007): 3. Bas van Fraassen takes the stronger objection to this
inferential reasoning no matter what the context is; even if it is empirical a posteriori. For
more on addressing van Fraassen’s objection see Douven (1999).
17For the role of moral knowledge in non-inferential reasoning see Bart Streumer, ”In-
ferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74
(2007): 4-5.
18Morrison, 91.
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This methodology is not so far astray from the epistemological realists
empiricism, such a methodology I have assumed thus far, since the onto-
relationship has still been preserved. This form of method has replaced a
posteriori knowledge with a priori but the apprehension of such knowledge
is still preserved by the onto-relationship of reality. Moral intuition may
serve as an a priori conception, which can be expressed either doxastically
or in a self-evident or incorrigible way. I do not see any good reason for
why moral judgments should not function as evidence for a belief. These
judgments are not empirically based but intuitively based. These intuitions
are objective and are grounded in an objective reality, just as is any other
criterion for evidence by empirical standards. The only differentiation be-
tween moral intuitions and empirical judgments is whether they are a priori
or a posteriori but are still harmonious with epistemological realism and the
onto-relationship between reality and knowledge. This causal relationship
may simply be impressed upon us logically prior to our experience.19
3 Inferential Justification in Foundationalism
and Coherentism
Logically prior to such inferential reasoning is intuition for reasons previously
discussed. These intuitions may be basic beliefs. The belief that this glass
of water in front of me will quench my thirst if I drink it is not inferred
back from previous experiences coupled with an application of a synthetic a
priori principle of induction. Though this example is not how we form our
beliefs psychologically or historically, it can be formed via instances of past
experience and induction in the logical sense. However, when it does come
to inferential reasoning R.A. Fumerton provides two definitions for what it
means to say that one has inferential justification.20
19If the epistemological realist’s need for empiricism must be appeased by some expe-
riential medium then it may certainly follow that the knowledge of certain ethical and
religious truths may certainly come about a posteriori as well, though this is not the
typical approach or ’category’ for such knowledge.
20R.A. Fumerton, ”Inferential Justification and Empiricism,” The Journal of Philosophy
73 (1976): 564-65.
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D1 = S has an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E.
(1) S believes P.
(2) S justifiably believes both E and the proposition that E confirms P.
(3) S believes P because he believes both E and the proposition that E
confirms P.
(4) There is no proposition X such that S is justified in believing X and
that E&X does not confirm P.
D2 = S has an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E.
(1) S believes P.
(2) E confirms P.
(3) The fact that E causes S to believe P.
(4) There is no proposition X such that S is justified in believing X and
that E&X does not confirm P.
Given the explications of such definitions, both D1 and D2, there seems
to be good grounds for believing that P must be inferentially justified. It
is most certainly that case that D2 is more amenable to having scientific
knowledge in the sense that both (2) and (3) are confirmatory. D2-(3) is
certainly difficult to substantiate without begging the question. Having E
cause S to believe P is difficult to distance from some form of transitive
relation. Inferential justification may also be expressed probabilistically or
determined probabilistically.21 I have little contention with such definitions
of inferential justification; my concern is whether this is most amicable within
a foundationalist’s or coherentist’s noetic structure.
Both D1 and D2 offer, I believe, to be successful accounts of inferential
justification. However, I do find both definitions to be problematic for the
empiricist on the bases of foundationalism, of which I will argue that such
inferential justification and non-epistemological direct realism is more ami-
21This may be expressed by Thomas Bayes’ theorem for conditional probability:
p(H |E) = p(H)p(E|H)/p(E) or by his rule for belief change: Pe(H) = p(H |E). If my
belief p is going to be justified probabilistically then it must be greater than 0 and less
than or equal to 1 where p is > .5. Suppose that after all the evidence that is available is
possessed and I have come to a value of precisely .5 for p. If I reject p as being true then
I have just as much of a chance of being wrong about that as I do as being right. When p
has a value of .5, all things considered, then I believe it would be acceptable to be believe
p, p, or to be agnostic. For more on the role of probability in inferential reasoning see
Igor Douvens ”Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent,” Philosophy of Science
66 (1999): S424-S435.
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cable to the coherentist and that a non-epistemological realist who adheres
to foundationalism cannot successfully account for new beliefs.
Such inferential justification is certainly compatible with foundationalism
but making all empirical claims to be inferential seems to be over-committing
to inferential reasoning. Suppose I am walking in the field and on the next
hill over I see an object. For all purposes, my phenomenological faculties
indicate to me that there is something on the next hill. This belief is held
for a reason, primarily that my phenomenological faculties inform me that
something is on the next hill over, but this is not a reasoned belief. I may
certainly infer certain properties consistent with D1 and D2 such as the
belief that the object has a particular color or that it omits a certain sound
or that it has a particular smell. My belief that an object is on the next hill
over from me seems to be quite basic. I am not inferring its existence from
other object-likenesses. I am completely unaware as to the identity of this
object, or better yet, whether this object is unique or unknown. Suppose that
this object has never been known before I experienced it. This makes the
situation quite different from Fumerton’s glass of water and is not a future
tensed proposition nor is it a subjunctive conditional.
Inferential reasoning as described by D1 and D2 are certainly kind to
empiricism when it comes to scientific knowledge. Certain unknown entities
may become known by inferential means. We can infer the existence of
protons, quarks, and other elementary particles by predicting what effects
such entities may have in certain situations. This may be causal in nature and
may be confirmed by inference. However, it is not the case that we directly
experience the existence of these particles (for all intents and purposes, it
certainly is the case that we experience particles when we run in to a wall
and even then we experience the strong nuclear force over the particles).
Nevertheless, epistemological direct realism and new belief formation can be
non-inferentially justified.22
With such a methodology for inferential reasoning it may be argued that
the foundationalist framework requires a presupposing of coherentism. This
would bring inference to the best explanation into close contact with the
22This is not to ignore other experiential data such as religious experience. Other propo-
sitional beliefs may be basic but non-empirical such as mathematical truths. My concern
is oriented towards empirical basic beliefs. Additionally, suppose that today is Friday. I
cannot change my belief to believe that it is now Sunday or Monday. Some beliefs are
non-inferentially justified and involuntary. Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981) 25.
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holistic view of explanation.23 Philip Kitcher argued that this holistic view
of inferential reasoning
[holds] that [scientific] understanding increases as we decrease the
number of independent assumptions that are required to explain
what goes on in the world Explanations serve to organize and sys-
tematize our knowledge in the most efficient and coherent possible
fashion. Understanding, on this view, involves having a world-
picturea scientific Weltanschauungand seeing how various aspects
of the world and our experience of it fit into that picture.24
Inferentially justified empirical beliefs are more in sync with a coheren-
tist noetic structure. When making inferential claims the proposition being
inferred from must cohere to a proposition already accepted as truth. Infer-
ential reasoning is not necessarily non-foundational, but if empirical claims
are strictly inferential then coherentism is best suited. No matter what the
belief in question is to be it must be inferentially referred back to another
experientially valid belief (within the scope of empirical discussion).
David Hume brought to our attention a problem with inferential reason-
ing, which is especially important to the present task given his empiricism.
As to past experience, it can be allowed to give direct and cer-
tain information of those precise objects only and that precise
period of time which fell under it cognizance. But why this expe-
rience should be extended to future times, and to other objects,
which for all we know, may be similar in appearanceThis, I must
confess, seems to be the same difficultyThe question still recurs:
on what process of argument this inference is founded? Where
is the medium, the interposing ideas which join propositions so
very wide of each other?25
Hume is correct, it does not follow. There are plenty of possible worlds
that match the actual world up to the present time, but then diverge wildly,
23Philip Clayton, ”Inference to the Best Explanation,” Zygon 32 no. 3 (1997): 387.
24Philip Kitcher, ”Scientific Explanation,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 13 (1989): 182.
25David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. IV, 2, in Philo-
sophical Inquiry Eds. Jonathan E. Adler and Catherine Z. Elgin (Indianapolis, IN: Hack-
ett, 2007), 181-82.
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so that inductive inferences would mostly fail in those other worlds. It is by
no means inevitable that inductive reasoning should be successful; its success
is one more example of the fit between our cognitive faculties and the world.26
The criteria for the best inference are simplicity, beauty, and consilience (fit
with other favored or established hypotheses).27 Inferentially justified new
beliefs create less dissonance with coherentism than with foundationalism.
What is needed logically prior to the acceptance or justification of new belief
is an evidence base. This is the set of beliefs used, or appealed to, in conduct-
ing an inquiry.28 Recall Torrance’s onto-relations. This onto-relation allows
for inference to be a bridge between the ontological-epistemological divide.
It is the onto-relationship that serves as Humes missing medium. It is this
”web” of onto-relations and consilience that function best with coherentism.
Thus, to think rightly and in terms of inference and a posteriori reasoning
means to connect things up with other things, thinking their constituent in-
terrelations, and thus it is important for thinking to determine what kind of
relation that exists between the realities contemplated.29
4 Conclusion
There is a long historical development of onto-relations and inferential rea-
soning with primary influence by the contemporary science of the twentieth
century and philosophers. Inferential reasoning is a widely practiced method-
ology in the contemporary spheres of science, the philosophy of religion, and
the philosophy of science. Bas van Fraassen, as an antirealist, is one of the
leading opponents of such inferential reasoning and its use of the probability
calculus. Despite Alvin Plantinga’s reliabilism he has made recent contri-
butions to the onto-relations and scientific knowledge.30 As Robert Audi
put it, the contemporary task is discerning whether inferential and scientific
26Plantinga, 295-97.
27These criteria may certainly be unnecessary in the case of paradigm shift with war-
ranted evidence (preservation of consilience). Additionally, beauty and simplicity are
certainly preferred but as long as the inference is in relation to reality then these two
criterions may be inapplicable. Consilience is the most important criterion.
28Ibid., 167.
29Morrison, 107.
30Plantinga’s reliabilism would serve as an antecedent to scientific knowledge just like
foundationalism would as previously discussed. However, it is difficult to separate the
external element from the internalist nature of the task.
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knowledge is best suited for foundationalism or coherentism.31
This a posteriori methodology inevitably turns all such knowledge into
scientific knowledge. Despite all a posteriori knowledge being scientific in
nature the onto-relations are preserved in empha priori non-empirical knowl-
edge. Intuitions and basic beliefs may serve as antecedents for further in-
ductive reasoning from which to use as the evidence base for the web of
consilience and onto-relations.32 Such methodological and inferential reason-
ing is not necessarily restricted to foundationalism, as Fumerton had argued
since there are legitimate onto-relational basic beliefs. If these onto-relational
beliefs serve as antecedents from which further inductive or abductive rea-
soning is used then inferential reasoning becomes better understood when it
is justified by other doxastic elements in the onto-relational ”web”.
31Robert Audi, Epistemology ed. 3, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 300-1.
32This goes to show that one belief would require the logically antecedent justification
of one or more other beliefs. This raises the problem of regress but if a basic belief serves
as the unjustified justifier for that belief then it may be a justified antecedent. Lawrence
Bonjour, ”The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge,” in Paul Moser, Empirical
Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 117.
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